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Beyond Irony: The Ul1l1amable's Appropriation of 
its Critics in a Humorous Reading of the Text 
Jennifer Jeffers 
... lrulhs are illusions of which one has forgonen thai they ar~ 
illusions: worn-oul metnphors which have become powerless to 
affect the senses: coins which have their obverst effaced and now 
are no longer of account as coin~ bUI /llerl!ly as metal. 
- Friedrich NietlSChc 
In traditional Becken criticism, the most conventional interpretation of the 
narrator's activil), in The Umwm(lble posits thai the namHive is aUempling 
loeslablish "his" own self-identity but "[hlis search for self-knowledge has 
failed because it has produced only fiction" (Solomo n 83). Another variety 
of this interpretation poses the Unnamablc's dilemma in Exislentiallanguage: 
"&islence affirms merely that something is: essence denotes what it is .... 
By the time we reach The Unnamable. the collapse of essence is virtually 
complete: the voice is a mere existence crying out thai it exists" (Levy 104), 
As DennisA, Foster argues in his Lacanian reading of The UIIIIQmable, which 
includes an evaluation of the cri tical exegesis surrounding the text, the tradi· 
tional critic produces an image of narrative authority and then, identifying 
with thatlextual authority, (the crit ic) transfers and assumes me text' :, struggles 
as her own interpretative difficulties, In other words. the critic creates in her 
reading a "coherent subjectivity" that allows herto "find in Beckett's works 
that the difficulty. even impossibility. of telling a story makes his refusal to 
lapse: into a despairing silence only further evidence of hi s heroic humanity. 
makes Becken the paragon of modernist man" (Foster %), While traditional 
critics have produced viable and certainly pedagogically practical readings 
of the novel, Paul Sove. in 'The Image of the Creator in Beckeu 's Postmodem 
Writing," has identified the difficulty in such writing : ", , , the fundamental 
Modem aesthet ic liter-if), impulse ... simply does no! ..... ork in a Postmodem 
world . It is hope lessly out-of-date. It is di sclosed as merely anotherstrattgy 
to reify and evade the: pain of contemporary ex.istence and not a positivt 
creative response" (Bov~ 62). In this reification . the Humanist or traditional-
is t. accordi ng 10 Bovt "Modernist." perspective covers over diversity and 
difference in an effonto make the "meaning" of the text live up to a precon-
cei Ved. acceptable universal. 
It is my contemion that Beckett's tex t can nm be adequately read for irony 
by the Humanist or the Romantic critic. Th~ Unnamabfe always already es· 
capes the confines of a traditional reading prod uced by the ironic critic who 
auempts to appropri.ue-reduco-Lhe tex t to a stable sense-making machine. 
For Bec kett's text. following its own lines of escape. simpl y refuses to be' 
rendered the exemplar of the reductive paradigm of a traditional concept of 
irony. What we see occu r is that irony reduces the text to a "failure" concern-
ing i15 sense-making capabilities, while it simultaneous ly allows the critic to 
( ironically) "fai l" in her task of textual interpreter; in other words. Beckeu's 
text "fails," and so the cri tic's text must also "fail."lbe idea of post-modem 
humor slips the noose of the "aesthetic of failure" by opening up textual 
interpretation that permits the reader to enjoy the text without the burden of 
representation and an aesthetic of universalized meaning. In order to be in a 
position to read post-Humanist humor in The Unnamobk we must first peel 
away two layers of critical residue that have been gradually deposited on lhe 
text over time in Becken scholarship: one. that of stable irony. which pro-
motes the Humanistic rationa l world view, and two, that of Romantic irony. 
which exemplifies the quest for ide ntity. 
One of the most common perspecti ves that critics adopt in their reading 
of The Unnamabfe is a reading that interprets the text as an ironic narrative 
discourse. In the Humanist literary tradition. reading for irony allows lhe 
crilic Q priori the right to investigate the privileged concept of identity or the 
self: "Irony has, since Plato. been indissociable from the problems of self-
knowledge and of self-expression. along with all the ontological and tpiste-
mological questions attendant thereon" (Lang 37). Indeed. with Ihe example 
of Socrates Western thought has plolted its points of intersection and diver-
gence carefully on its ontolog ical and epistemological mappings : Socrates 
may be ironic in relation to being and knowledge. but. in its interpretation or 
Socrates. the West never allows Socrates to relinquish a foundational prin-
ciple that renders them stable. In the history of ideas, the figure or Socrates is 
the source for both a Humanist view of irony and the Romantic rendering of 
irony. Humanist irony relies on an undi sguised correspondence between the 
OOHaid and the said that is a reflection of Socrates denying he is wise (when 
apparently he is wise). Romantic irony relies more on an abstract form of 
irony that is a counterpan to the so-caJled Socratic maxim. "Know thyself': 
through a dialectical denial of the self. one negates and then affinns images 
of the self in a seemingly ad injill i fllm process. But the first principle of the 
process is the self which is founded upon a stable onlology. and so. the pr0-
cess is finite . 
80th of these fonns of irony have been employed by critics in their read-
ings ofOeckett. The first reading of irony is produced by the Humanist critic: 
her reading of irony functions as a way to k.now her world in relation to 
herself by showing herself both sides of her own statements. In relation to 
the world. irony is a means to cha llenge and "adjust" the existing order. but 
always with the fixed idea of the preservation and improvement of the exi5t-
ing order. 'The second reading of irony is produced by the Romantic critic: 
her reading of irony functions as a means to explore her world. which for the 
Romantic is the subjective self. Each approach relies upon a traditional in-
terpretation of Socratic irony that is characterized by "saying the opposite of 
wllat you mean" and relies on a stable and overt reading of a texl. In other 
words. the author has endowed the text with meaning--even if she has said 
precisely the opposite of what she means-und the "smart" reader will un -
derstand the "said" to not be the meaning and the "not said" as the true mean-
ing. For a traditional interpretation of Socratic irony. the power and beauty 
of irony lie in the reader's clever malching of the opposite of what is said 
with the meaning of what is not said. 
Romantic irony may be read as a curious mixture of Humanist irony with 
a more sophisticated irony that borders. at times. on postmodcm humor be-
cause it nirts ever so dangerously with the di ssolution of Ihe self. Romantic 
irony's primary link with Humani st irony is that it functions in much the 
same way as "saying the opposite of what you mean." The important differ-
ence. however. between Humanist irony and Romantic irony is that Roman-
tic irony promotes an image of itself that is not characterized by stability: 
Romantic irony tends to recoil from the material world into an abstract realm 
that Kierkegaard so criticized in the German Romantics. According to 
Kierkegaard. thi s posture in Romantici sm leads to a negative ironic retreat 
on the part of the ironist: 'The producing ego is the same as the produced 
ego: 1=1 is the abstract identity . .. . But this infinity of thought in Fichte is 
lilce every other Fichtian infinity. that is. a negati ve infi nity. an infinity with-
out finitude, an infinity void of a ll content" (Kierkegaard 290). Kierkegaard's 
critique of the "negative infinity" of Fichte points to Kierkegaard's overall 
problem with Hegelian abstraction which, by its very nature, is unable 10 
affect action in the empirical world. Instead, "void of all content," it univer· 
salizes what it cannot empirically know and reduces all difference lOfllga/i". 
if)' (non-bei ng). The Romantic 's solipsism coupled with a sophisticaled ironic 
recoili ng from the material world would seem to suggest an ideal interpreta-
tive stralegy with which to read The Unnamable. The Unnamable appears to 
resemble the Romantic ironist in that the text "speaks" incessantly of "him-
self." break.ing this narrative impulse only to fabricate a story told in tradi-
tional representational form. Bul Romantic irony never truly leaves the realm 
of meani ng or sense, no matter how abstract it aspires to become because of 
its stable ontologicaJ foundation. 
Samuel Beckett begins The UnnamabJe with the questions: "Where now? 
Who now? When now?" (Beckett 29 1), which are then supposedly answered 
at the end of the text with a rambling four-page sentence that begins: '1'he 
place, I' ll make it all the same . .. I'll make myself a memory . . . I'm flO( the 
first. I won' t be the first, it will best me in the end ... " (4 11 ). The apparent 
circularity of the tex t actually belies the impression o f a stable beginning and 
end. If a circle has no beginning or end , there is no certain or stable point of 
entry. It would seem that the narrati ve, then, may not actually begin at the 
beginning and whether it does or not we have no way of knowing. We enter 
the loop of narrative at the "beginning" of the book but given this text we 
cannot be positive that it is the beginning. The narrative refuses to give any 
definite answers, as the tex t' s final words are ambiguous and open-ended: 
" ... where I am, I don't know, I'll never know, in the silence you don 't know, 
you must go on, I can't go on, I'll go on" (414). 
The traditiona l reading of the end of (he novel reads the "voice's" "I'll go 
on" in lenns of human subjectivity, and hence, as a brave humanist stance 
that does not ninch in the face of the "void" of "nothingness." This view is 
discussed by Wayne Booth, for example, in A Rhe/oric of Irony in relation to 
The Umramab/e. Booth relates The Ulllrumab/e (0 the dire problem of "man" 
in the "modem age": " ... (becausel many modem men have seen themselves 
leetering perilously on that borderline, unablc to be sure either that the uni-
verse is meaningless or that they can di sccrn any meaning, it is not surprising 
that many poems and novels hover, as it were, between limited ironies and 
the ultimate ironic denial" (Rhetoric 253). A limiled irony is. of course,ln 
irony in which there is an explicit com::spondence between lhe nOl·said and 
the said. "Ultimate ironic deniaJ." however, is a vague tenn Booth employs 
for all types of literature that seem to manifest irony but do not evidence a 
stable re lationship between overt and COvert meanings. Ironic denial is be -
yond "overt" irony and falls into Booth's category of"Unstab le-Covert-lnfi-
nite" irony: this irony is of the obtuse variety: " ... many modem authors will 
refuse even this degree of open declaration. leaving us to infer the depths of 
lheir ironies from superficial and del iberate ly ambiguous signs" (257). 
Citing nearly the entire firsl page of the The Unnamable. Booth offers the 
following summary of Beckett 's calculated "failure": 
II would seem obvious that 10 attempt an interpretation of such 
a passage is [0 invile ridicule. Beyond grammalicat analysis, 
looking up ~pht!cljc and aporia, if nece.nary, or nOling lhe 
stylistic devices imilating drin and despair, what can be said? 
To find meaning where meaninglessness is asserted, to seek 
an an of interpretation of a passage so clearly against inter-
pretation is to risk appeari ng like one of Becken's own char· 
acters. The passage seems to cha llenge every nOiion on which 
this book is based, and indeed every concept of any kind. , , . 
(258) 
This passage is the prototypic enactmen t-"imitating drift and despair"---of 
the "failure" or "impotence" syndrome that Dennis A. Foster atlributes to the 
modernist critic. If Booth cannot read Beckett, it is because Beckett's text is 
"so dearly against interpretation": if one ventures an interpretation one "risklsl 
appeari ng like one of Beckeu's own characters." Booth's tex t. however, would 
never be mistaken for one of Beckett 's texts Ilnl~ss Beckett decided 10 infil-
trate the discourse of Booth's text- for Booth's text lacks the duplic ity that 
characterizes Beckett's text. What is apparent is that Beckell's texts only 
"fail" from a Human ist point of view, and this perspective never resists suc-
cumbing to its own se lf-imposed theoretical cul-de-sac. 
A Romantic read ing of Th~ Uwwmable wou ld read the text as one thai 
continuously seeks stability all the while it decenters itself by refusing to 
produce any fann of center or outer edge. The Romantic posture is one in 
which irony seems continually to move the subject being ironized farther 
and farther away from the centered se lf; yet. the self is the contriver of this 
sol ipsistic fantasy. and so. irony never goes beyond the se lf and never be-
comes anything e lse but the self-no maner how many disguises the ironist 
dons. According to a Romantic reading of the Th~ U"namablt'. the text con-
tinuoui ly creates narrative strategies whereby it may move away from the 
self. detach itself from its own narrative. whereas all the while it is in rIC:( 
attempting to move toward the self, to attach or reattach to its own stable 
identity. In other words, the text poses, postures and plays games with itself 
in order to "know" itself more fully . If we were to enact a reading of the 
novel as an example of Romantic irony. we would read for a1l oflhe ways in 
which the se lf of the text seeks to know itself. This inability to come inao 
self-knowledge is amplified by the text in its difficulty locating itself in time: 
"1 say years. though there are no years. What matter how long? Years isooe 
of Basil' s ideas. A short time. a long time it's all the same" (308·9). The 
concept of time in the text is in fact completely discarded by the: narrative: 
" Hell itself. ahhough eternal . dates from me revoll of Lucifer. It is therefort 
permissible. in the light of this dis tant analogy, to think of myself as being 
here forever. bUi not as having been here forever" (295-96). Since it is im· 
possible to "date" the revolt of Lucifer. the text plays it "safe" by calling it 
"eterna'" anyway: the lexl actuaJly dates itself in infinity because it refuses 
to date itself at all. as "nol as having been here forever."n.e text contradicts 
itself into a timelessness as the power of the "lie" indicates that the te,..;1 is not 
able 10 render a plausible representatjon of a stable identity. 
In a recent rereading of Romantic irony that includes a reading of Becten. 
i rof!Y alld Ethics if! Narralive. Gary J. Hand ..... e rk attempts to revive Schltgtl 
via Lacan in an effon to put forth an "ethical irony" that will produce I 
responsible being in society. Nevertheless. the focus is still centered on the 
solipsistic se lf. although it has been renamed the "subject" and the searth is 
for " identity" : " Ethical irony thus implies a holistic view of identity. a pos-
s ible reintegration beyond incompatibles" (Handwerk 3). For HandweB.. 
irony's work and "force" is to "underm.ine the integrity of the subject itsoem/si 
to imply exis ted. It attacks the notion of the subject as equivalenllo a COD· 
scious intenlionality or a personal self-consciousness" (3). In regard 10 
Bec ken . Handwerk wishes to show the ultimate breakdown oflhe "subjecl-
and its connection to the " social gesture": 
'Ille breakdown of the subject. seen in the fragmentation of 
the narrative presence throughout Beckett's work, liberates 
only althe cost of a heightened anxiety in the subject. Beckel! 
forces us to confront the potential emptiness of the social ges-
lure. the dislocation thai results from ironic abstraction de-
tached from historica l groUnding. He returns us to the funda-
mt:ntal incohc:renciell that we cannot and dare not ignore for 
100 long .. . , (17) 
II would seem that Handwerk is merely reiterating in tenns of social con-
sciousness the traditional concerns of the Romantic ironist: the self/subject. 
Despite Handwerk's twentieth century Lacanian language, the currency of 
his theoretical economy is still fundamentally Romantic. relying on the foun-
dational principle of identity, 
As we witnessed in our Romanti c reading of Th~ Unllomab/~, the text 
suuggles against the "fact" that it will never establish an origin or gain an 
identity, This struggle is a parody of the Romantic quest; irony slips into 
postmOdem humor, Even Handwerk 's updated Romantic irony cannot allow 
a reading that "threatens to become infinite" (Elhics 191). In the same way, 
Handwerk 's reading of How Ills (Becken's next nove l after Th~ Unnamablt!) 
must stop the infinity of the text, and relies o n the narrato r of How /, Is to 
Mrecount" the text for a final reading of identity, even if this identity is poly_ 
valent: 
Closer examinalion reveals that what we really have here is a 
triple·selved narralor. , , , The narrator is our last refuge of 
mt:aning. Yet thai narrator 's narrative reveals an insistent di -
vorce of the mental faculties, of the modes of selfbood, thai 
corrodes the cenainty of the synthesizi ng power of subjective 
consciousneu. , , . Becken here mows how the breakdown of 
the subject is a function of the incoherence of language, o f tM 
multiple, but not interdependent, ways of an.iculalion that con · 
stitute language. (187-88) 
Yel, to first say that the text has a "triple·selved narrator" is to state that the 
text is actually a schizophrenic sense'producing machine and not a stable 
sense'producing identity-of-one. For spealcing of the "corrodeldj " "cenainlY 
ofLhe synthesizing power of subjective consciousness" and the "breakdown 
oftbe subject" does not constitute a claim that subjectivity will rebound and 
reconstitute the identity of a narrator. If anything, Handwerk's read ing of 
Romantic irony in Beckett ironicall y points to the very impossibility of a 
recuperation of the subjecl. 
Thinking beyond irony is oUI first step toward a humorous interpretation 
of The UntUlmable. Both of the traditional critics of irony that we have read 
here write with the goal of translating Beckett's text into a meaningful. sense· 
prodUCing discourse on topics privileged in their respective critical para-
di&ms. But the problem with Th~ Ullnamablt! and many of Beckett 's tex IS is 
that they do not "make sense" in what is traditionally accepted as "goodsenstH 
or "common sense"; it is for this reason that the traditional critic CInI'\()( lid· 
equately rt!ad Beckett. Irony is translatable because it plays inside of the el· 
isting language game-it follows the rules of representation and operItes 
within the confines of "good sense." Humor, however. is that which plays on 
the surface of significaLion before. or at the point of. sense or meaning. Gilles 
Deleuze theorizes that we have passed beyond the order that privileges rtpre· 
sentation and the individual- subjectivity being a pre-condition forboth trq. 
cdy and irony. According to Deleuze, the transvaluation (to use Nietzsche 's 
term) has occurred and it is no longer possible to create texts that enact th!: 
tragic and the ironk. That is not to say, however, that these texts have ceased 
production: these texts, both literary and critical. continue to be produced 
long after the devaluation of the economy of representation. 1l\e fOflnef or· 
der "givel s ) way" to humor, which does not rely on representation and privi· 
leges neither subjectivity nor objec tivity. for this new "sense" does nO( prion· 
ti ze on a model of hierarchy or the Ideal : 
TIle tragic and the ironic gi ve way to a new value. that ofhu· 
mor. For if irony is the co-extensiveness of being with the indi -
vidual, or of the I with representation. humor is the co-exten· 
sivellC5s of sen.§e with non ·sense. Humor is the art of the sur-
faces . nd of the doubles , of nomad singularities and of the 
.lw.ys displ.ced aleatory poin! .... (Logic )41 ) 
In other words. irony is dependent upon a correspondence theory of language 
which insures that the "not said" will always be identified by the reader be-
cause the "not said" is merely the negation of the "said ." As long as everyollt' 
using a panicular language "agrees" that meaning lies lmdu the surface of 
language then the correspondence or representational mode oflanguagefunc· 
tions. Deleuze employs a metaphor of the horizontal to define humor. sense 
moves on the surface of language. horizonlally in different directions. mani· 
festing a rhizomatic discourse. The horizontal movement is opposed to . \·er· 
tical movement downward that retrie ves the meaning Ilndunealh the signifi · 
cation. If it is the case. as Nietzsche suggests in the passage taken as oor 
opening epigram. that truths which we believe to lie underneath language art 
actually " illusions of which one has forgotten thatlhey are illusions" (NieWche 
180)-and this is always already the condition of language- then sense lies 
on the surface of language be/orr the sense-making operation has taken pllCt. 
in Deleuzian tenns. "sense is not to be confused with s ignification" (Logic 
51). In other words, s ignification is ne utral. without negation or affirma. 
tion-and uhramoral in the Nietzschean sense of beyond or o utside moral 
consideration. until a sense-making capability is imposed upon it and mean-
ing rendered. 
A humorous reading is possible when the "good" sense of truth and rep-
resentation is no longer an acceptable c UlTency- like Nietzsche ' s " ... coins 
which have their obverse effaced and now are no longer of account as coins 
but merely as metal"-and non-sense sudde nl y appears in its place . In a hu-
morous reading, "non-sense" is not lack of sense but merely a different sense 
than what the order of representation recognizes as sense or " good" sense . 
Non-sense or the absu rd are express ions used in existential ism or in "the 
philosophy of the absurd" in which the sense they speak of is dependent 
upon one stable rendering of sense. "good sense," but that one sense is lack-
ing in the world; therefore. the existentialist mourns the absence of. loss o f. 
the decline of or the "essential" deficiency o f sense in the world . A working 
definition of Ikleuuan non-sense. on the other hand. would indica te the over-
abundance of sense in any given s igni fication . There is never too lillie sense. 
there is always 100 much sense produced : 
From the poim of view of the structure. 00 the contrary. there 
is always 100 much sense: an excess produced and over-pro-
duced by non-sense as a lack of itsel r .... Likewise. non-sense 
does nOl have any panicular sen'IC , bUI is oppo~e<l to the ab-
sence of sense rather than 10 the sense thaI it produces in e.lt-
cess-without ever maintaining with its product the !>imple 
relation or e.ltclusion to which some people would like to re -
duce them. Noosense is that which has no sense. and that which . 
as such and as it enacts the donalion of sense. is opposed 10 
the absence of sense. (Logic 71) 
We will see that the text of The Unnomable mimics the act of creation of 
sense and in that enactment creates not sense in the realm of representation 
or the "good" copy. but does not create non-sense in lenns of lack of sense . 
either. The humorous texi mim ics the role of the ironist in o rder to create a 
difJerrnl sense- in order to c reate difference--the difference between "good" 
sense and a lack of sense. 
When too little sense is the problem. as posited generally by traditional 
critics in their reading of The Unnamable. then one can be certai n thai one is 
caughl inside Ihe realm of represenlation; for representalion always insists 
upon a faithful resemblance that does not offer. more th~n the original or 
primary object. In order for a code of rep~nta~lon to eXist there must be I 
primary object that is representable and the Identity of the represented object 
is of paramount imponance. 11le concept of primacy insures that there is an 
original identity-for the Platonists an Ideal or the original ldel-that the 
"good" copy faithfully and accurately represents. Such a concept also lies 
behind Weste rn culture's repression of difference: from phi losophical toeco-
nomica!. political and cultural difference, as well as difference in teons of 
racial. sexuaJ and religious alterity. If difference "escapes" the control of the 
"good copy" the order is threatened, and when the order is threatened we 
reven to re-telling the common siory of the West : "It is a question of assur-
ing the triumph of the copies over simulacra. of repressing simulacra. keep"" 
ing them completely submerged. preventing them from Climbing to the sur· 
face, and 'insinuating themselves' everywhere" (Logic 257). A certain amount 
of discrepancy. however. steals into the good copy Mcause the simulacrum 
is able 10 produce an '!fecI of the good copy. According to Oeleuze. even 
"Plato discovers. in a flash of an inslan t, that the simulacrum is no! simply a 
false copy. bUI that il places in question the very notations of copy and model" 
(Logic 256). Indeed . Socrates cannot be differentiated from the sophisis. es· 
pecially in Ihe early di alogues. Fonunately. "good sense" saves reprtsena· 
tion and indeed we have built a tradition on "common" or "good" sense. 
According to Deleuze. there is no originaJ identity, universal or model. only 
copies (simu lacra) producing themselves in a non-hierarchical system ofdif-
Ference and singu larities. 
In DiJflrrnct el rlpllilion, Deleuze employs a metaphor of the mm as a 
way to depict the difference. the excess. between the representation ofiden-
tity and the humorous enactment, or repetition. of that identity. I HUOlOf does 
rt:-present the identity in terms of identity, but it ma.rk.r over the "original" 
idenlity and in that masking. or repetition. creates Other. creates difference. 
Foucault. commenting on Deleuzc's DiJJlrrnce el rlp/tition. cbaraclerius 
aptly and succi nctly the role of "good" sense and difference in "the philoso-
phy of representation": 
Good sense is the world's most effective agent of division in 
its recognitions. its establishment of equivalences. its sensi-
tivity to gaps. its gauging of distances. as it assimilates and 
separates. And it is good sense thai reigns in the philosophy of 
representation. Let us pervert goOO sense and allow thought 
to play outside the ordered table of resemblances: then it will 
appear as the: vertical dimension of intensities. because inten-
sity. well before its gradation by representation. is in itself 
difference: difference that displaces and repeats itself. ... (Urn . 
guose 183) 
In our cuhure "good sense" has an undefeated record in its "establishment of 
equivalences" and in its ability to "assimilate" and "separate": "good sense" 
acts in thi s manner so that it may quickly close off the negotiation of 
singularities and the negotiation of the space between singularitie5 which 
constitute difference. Language is not simply a si&n for truth. signification 
evobng "good sense" as the vertica l model of language posits. but a code of 
signification that must be rendered meaningful. It is the aCI of rendering-
the negotiation of singularities and the space between the si ngularities-that 
creates or produces meaning. Therefore, if we could "pe rvert good sense and 
allow thought to play outside the ordered table of resemblances." then . as 
Foucault suggests. we could perceive the structure (of represen tation) that 
manipulates our perspective in such a manner that we always already think 
and see in tenns of order. gradation and recognition: " it will then appear as 
the: vertical dimension of intensities. because intensity. well before its grada-
tion by representation. is in itself difference." 
Reading against. though not in opposition to the tradition, we see that 
humor has stolen into a text when the language no longer re-presents the 
"good" copy of the Idea or original. but presents instead the "bad" copy or 
simulacrum. Humor enacts representation from an "inauthentic" posilion-
for humor does not wish to produce the "good" copy or valid good sense-
but pnxluces difference and Othu sense not based on the foundation of rep-
rtStntation. The Unnamable perverts the traditional concept of representa-
tion and meaning through a fastidiously accurate parodying of the ironic 
search for identity and knowledge, just as Deleuze's Sacher-Masoch per-
verts the law through a precisely controlled adherence to the letter of the law. 
1be enactment of humor presents a subtle and surreptitious repetition of the 
category of representalion: making the gesture of resemblance in the very 
ICt of discrediting and di smantling the representational order. This move-
ment. of course. is not naive ly conceived and we should keep in mind that 
there is an "element of contempt in the submission" to representation and 
that the texi's "apparent obedience conceals a criticism and a provocation" 
(Dele uze, Sachu-Masoch 77), Similar to the enemy infiltrating the mililary 
headquaners, humor le t loose in the realm of represen tation spells the even-
tual loss of power or eve n the downfall of the reg ime. Funhermore, even the 
.fuspicio" that the Un namable is playing the role of pretender to the throne or 
representation in a humorous enac tment of traditional irony puts into ques· 
tion the very idea of the feasibi lity of representation. For the "rumor" that 
the enemy could infiltrate and dismantle the power structure, in thi s instance 
irony and the epistemology that informs it, casts enough doubt on the struc· 
ture to weaken its credibility. 
To return to T"~ Ufl1UlmabJ~. one of the most evident aspects ofme text is 
the Un namable 's acknow ledgment of reiterati ng the words, the codes, and 
epistemology of the tradition. The te;llt admits the infi ltration of'1heir voices." 
their system of language and the ir hierarchy of ideas into its own signifiC.1-
tion : "They've blown me up with their voices, like a balloon, and even as I 
collapse, it's them I hear .... the little murmur of unconsenting man, to 
murmur what it is their humanity stifles .... I won ' l say it, I can ' l say it, l 
have no language but theirs ..... (325). The Un namable is not nai \'e con· 
cerning the fact thai the system has in filtrated its text, nor is it naive in rela· 
tion 10 its own ability to produce a lex!: this text, any text, is always already 
a product of an over-dc temlined culture whose sole mark of distinction is il5 
vast. yet simple, abilily to monitor difference. To acknowledge that ''They'\'e 
blown me up wilh the ir voices. like a balloon," is to be aware that one must 
operate in the system. according to the system, knowing that to openlychil-
lenge the system will put an end to one's ability to speak. With this knowl-
edge, then. the Unnamable could choose 10 be '·silent." and the text speaks 
often of going silent: or, with this knowledge, the text could repeat the tradi· 
tion. it could mimic the language it has been taught not in an effort to pr0-
duce resemblance. but in order 10 produce humor. 
A humorous interpretation of the text recognizes the slippage in the text's 
stories. The slippage is the space, or as Foucault phrases it. the "non-place," 
that opens up between "good sense" and non~sense or different sense. The 
Unnamable e;llists in the opening. the "non-place:' between sense and non· 
sense and in this way. the text exposes a double logic: the logic with which 
we read and affirm representati on is the very same logic with which we read 
and affirm di fference. In other words. the very logic that upholds the repre· 
sentational order is the same logic that will deconstruct that order. The logic 
of the text that says it lacks sense-all the while operating under the guises 
of "good" sense-is lhe same logic thaI produces a humorous reading by 
producing 100 much sense: 
At no molN:ntdo I know what I'm tAlking about, oor of whom, 
nor of where, nor how, nor why, but I could employ fift), 
wretches for this sinister operation and still be shon of a fifty. 
first. to close the circu it, that I"now, without "no ..... ing what it 
means . ... Nothing to do but stretch OUI comfortably on the 
rtd. in the blissful "nowledgc you are nobody for all ctcr. 
nity . .. . I knew it, there might be a hundred of u~ and still 
wc'd lac" thc hundred and first. we'll always be shon of me. 
(338-39) 
In the text's double movement, it plays at onc level the ironist who has the 
"mowledge you are nobody for all eternity" all the while it "haws" it is the 
subjectively important writer of this text. At another level, it is the humorist 
who in this claim merely repeats what cannot be represented, that there is no 
wly to reach a "knowledge you are nobody for all eternity" and yellhe mim-
icking of the master 's voice produces an odd se nse: of si ncerity. In the claim 
that the text "could employ tifty wretches" but "still be short of a fifty-first," 
then "a hundred" but "lack the hundred and first," is a repetition that pro-
duces an excess of meaning. No matter how many dupes may be "employed" 
by the text. the text will always have mor~ than it needs. "an excess produced 
and over-produced by nonsense as a lack of itself' (Logic 71). For the claim. 
itself, does not lack sense: rather "it enacts the donation of sense" in the 
movement of the "bad" copy of representation, and it is this movement. thiOi 
surreptitious enactment. that produces humor and undennines the "good" 
sense of representation, When the authority of order of represen tation is 
usurped by repetition. then the "bad" copy-the simulacrum that does not 
correspond to the so-called. original-produces difference and difference gen-
erates multiplicities unheeded. Therefore, no mailer how many wretche~ are 
employed there is no way "to close the circuit," no way to stop proliferation 
of difference once the order of representation has been infiltrated by the "bad" 
copy. 
TIle text's narrative is most "be lievable," and hence mOSt subversive, when 
it makes the meta-narrative move of di stinguishing itself from the "stories" 
that it creates. The traditionalist reads irony in thi s move as the distinction 
between "self' and the stories that the narrative creates in order to come into 
"self-knowledge" or in order to "go on." The text makes this distinction doz-
ens of times during the course o f its narrative : " But who are these manUcs 
let loose on me from on hi gh for what they call my good, let us first try IIId 
throw a lillie ligh t on thaI. To tell the truth-no, first tbe story" (326). T'bt 
"maniacs" or "trOOp of lunatics" are, of course. the so-called narraton-
Murphy. Watt. Molloy, Malone , Mahood. Wonn- that the text claims 1Ob.a\'( 
crealed al some poi nt in its "narrati ve life." Yel , the very idea thai one could 
differenti ate hierarchically between the " truth" concerning the different n.'. 
rSlors lind the story "- no, first the sto ry"-should be a clue for the reader 0( 
the text concern ing the texl's ab ility 10 forget that truth is merely an "illu, 
sion" or a "worn-oul metaphor," From the perspeclive of representation "'( 
recognize that Ihe story 's "conlent" is unlikely to be "true"; but what we do 
assume 10 be true is thai the language of the lext will be "lrue",o lbe idea of 
"good" sense, BOl slippage occurs because the texl does not forget and it 
does nOI challenge. In its complic ity wi th the tradition. it makes tbc: sUm 
movemenl of repetition, for the text is well aware that it is masking over~ 
ability to fa ithfull y re- present a "good" copy: " Did they ever get Mahood to 
speak? It seems to me not. I think Murphy spoke now and then. the others 
100 perhaps, I don ' I remember. but il was clumsily done. you could sec the 
ventri loquist" (348) . Indeed, the ve ntriloquist both speaks and does IlOl 
speak--<1iv idi ng sense, yet creating "too much" sense, and creating adoubk 
logic where all things and no things make "good" sense. The double logic 
moves in such a way that the Un namable places the order of rtpre.sentatioa 
under suspicion through its own move to appropriate "their" words: 
NOl lo be able to open my mouth without proclaiminglhem. 
and our fe llowship, Ihal's what lhey imagine Ihey'll have me 
reduced 10, II 's a poor trick that consists in ramming a set of 
words down your gullet on the principle that you can 'I bring 
them up wi lhout being branded as belonging 10 their breed. 
8uIl'II fix their gibberish for them, I never understood a won! 
of it in any case. not a word of tne stories il spews, like gobbe15 
of vomit. My inabi lity 10 absorb. my genius for forlelling. art 
more than they reckoned with, Dear incomprehension. it's 
thanks 10 you I'll be mysdf, in the end. Nothing will remain 
of all the lies they have glulled me with. And I' ll be myself at 
lasl. as a slarv ling belches his odourless wind. before the bliss 
of coma, .. . (324-25) 
Although one may be tempted 10 read "ramming a set of words p'll 
your gullet on the pri nc iple that you can' t bring them up without being br1Ddcd 
as belonging to their breed" as mere irony-as mere railing against the es-
tablished order-it would seem that in this instance humor has the upper 
hand and is parodying the style and sentiment of irony to point toward a 
deeper and more fundamental problem: the inability to represent the West-
ern tradition in any other manner than through parody. The accusation of 
"the lies they have glutted me with" is not read as irony on the part of the 
humanist ironic critics. In fact. as we have seen, the stalement would not be 
"read" at all . The "lies" must be suppressed by the order because when one 
"lies" one in effect produces "bad" copies, or simu lacra which proliferate 
unheeded. leading us ever farther and farther away from the "Truth," When 
a narrative bases its entire narrative pn:x1uction on "lies," the Western Lnldi-
tion cannot accept it. cannot read it. and cannot see its own renection in the 
image presented in the accusation. 
What the traditional readership reads as the delightfully playful element 
in The Unnamab/~-the teltt's irony and irascibility-is often the point at 
which the Unnamable is at its most subversive. For example, the text begins 
by appearing ironic about almost everything it comments upon; a critic of 
irony, Booth or Handwerk. could have picked up on the extremely ironic 
and cri ticaJ tone at the beginning of the novel: 
Why did I have myself represented in the midst of men. the 
light of day? II seems to me it was none of my doing. We 
won't go inlo Ihat now, I can see them still. my delegates. 
The things they have told me! About men. the light of day. I 
refused to believe them. But some of it hIlS stock . ... Innate 
knowledge of my mother, for example. is Ihal conceivable? 
NO( for me, She was one of their favourite subjects, of con· 
versation. They also gave me the low-down on God. They 
laid me I depended on him, in the lasl analysis .... I remem· 
ber liule or nothing or lhese leclures. I cannol have under-
slood a great deal. But I seem to have retained cenain de-
scriptions. in spite of myself. They gave me courses on love, 
on intelligence. most precious, most precious. Some of this 
rubbish has come in handy on occasions, I don't deny it, on 
occasions which would never have arisen if they had left me 
in peace. I use it still,to scratch my arse with. , .. (297·98) 
Let us here brieny reinsert the ironic readings in the midst of our humorous 
reading, for me purpose of witnessing the surreptitious movement of humor 
as it glides ineffably across the surface of the text. For Booth. mis passage 
gives ample reference to ~e material. world. representing the major tenets 0( 
a civilized and even a loving Human ism: knowledge. the maternal. God and 
love. Even bener. the Unnamable of the text seems to be deriding them in an 
ironic manner: saying one thing but meaning the opposite. Although the 
Unnamable may be critical of the Western tradition, "he" would never COrtI-
pletely denounce it; instead. the Unnamabl~ crilici.zes experience au way 0( 
pointing out its discrepancies and, hence, Improvmg the system. According 
to the Humanist reading . the Unnamable definitely "plays within" the power 
structure. 
For a critic sympathetic to Handwerk's project. this passage once again 
affords a reading of irony that is more sophisticated than the Humanist's 
reading. In this passage we see the Unnamable shifting "his" roles and don· 
ning a new facade when it pleases "him." The text seems to double bId 00 
itself: ;'J cannot have understood a great deal," then "[bJut I seem to bave 
retained certain descriptions. in spite of myself." Though there is irony in the 
text's relIScting. in part. its first statement. the irony for the Romantic critic is 
contained in the fact that the "person" in the text, the pseudo Romantic. is 
suspended above this entire discourse watching "himselr' shift into one mode 
of irony ("Some of this rubbish has come in handy on occasions. I don't deny 
il. on occasions which would never have arisen if they had left me in peace1, 
then shift into yet another mode as the paragraph ends ("No no, here I am in 
safety, amusing myself wondering who can have dealt me these insigniflCllll 
wounds") . According to the Romantic reading, the Unnamable wants to com· 
plain about the fact that "the inestimable gift of life had been rammed dm\1I 
my gullet" (298). then tum back to a position of amusement and nonchalance 
by "wondering who can have deah me these insignificant wounds." 
From the point of view of humor, the above passage immediately puts 
into question the politics of representation: "Why did I have myself tepft-
sented in the midst of men, the light of day?" The UnnamabJe responds that 
" Ii It seems to me it was none of my doing," which is only partially thee8$(. 
The structure that affinns representation never gives one the opportunity to 
choose if one would like to be "represented." The Unnamable is fully aware 
that it is completely inscribed by the structure lhat constitutes representation. 
an~ so. the text seems to be up to some sort of game playing or parodyinglhat 
pomts to a more profound reason for its perversion. If we recall that Deleuzc's 
Sacher-Masoch in order to pervert the law and push it to its "furtherest con· 
sequences"-punishment--obeyed the law to the most extreme detail. then 
perhaps we can see that the Unnamable. too. plays Mnsoch in its effon 10 
perven and push to its "funherest consequences" the traditional ironic ren-
dering of the texl. When the Unnnmnble states thnl "I seem to have retained 
certain descriptions, in spite of myself." it i~ not being ironic; for the words 
that uphold the tradition are the very words that precipitate ils downfall. 1'l1e 
Unnamable has "retained certain descriptions" panly because it knows that 
it cannot escape "proclaiming them" even if it were to allempt to denounce 
them and ''the ir breed." The Un namable also has "retained certain descrip· 
tions'· so that it may "fix their gibberish for them ," so that it may produce the 
"bad" copy, and so that il may unravel "good" sense through the very enact-
men! of the order of representation . If punishment is the delight of Masoch, 
then playing outside of the restricted category of lIoense in an effort to effect 
the collapse of the tradition is the delight of Ihe Unnamable 
Movement to effect this collapse is e vident in the expo"e of anot her '·car· 
rot" that never fails to arouse great admiration on the part of the Humanillol, 
that is, the ontological search for origins founded on a pnnclple of non-be-
ing-based on an entirely abstract concept of negauon-an ontology that 
reduces all difference into a category of non -belllg. The Unnamable humor-
ously introduces the topic of ontology into its narrative of identity when it 
proffers: "First I'll say what l"m no\, that's how they taught me to proceed, 
then what I am ..... (326). Employing the Hegelian dialeetic the Un namable 
·'proceeds" 10 nam~ itself against those il believes itself not to be: "I am 
neilher, I needn't say, Murphy, nor Wall, nor Mercier, nor-no, I can't even 
bring myself to name them ... "(326). Of course, the naming in this passage, 
simi lar to so many other passages in the le)!.t , results in the narrative remain-
ing unnamablt. This game of naming the un namable works 3gnin~tthe tradl· 
tion-for the system is unable to name because of it .. own principle of nega-
tion. However, the problem that the Unnamable pre~nts in reading lor the 
name (identity) in the tradition of negative olllolog} is thnt it. the Un namable, 
will never be named all the while il has II name: the Unnamable_ 
This situation depicts Deleuze's definition of parado)!.. ··Good ~ense af· 
firms that in alt things there is a detenninable sense or dlre<:lIon C\t'fu): but 
paradox is the affirmation of both seases or direl:tlOns at the ,arne 111m" 
(Logic I); also purndoxes "always have the characteristic o f going In both 
directions at once, and of rendering identificat ion impos"lble " (Logic 
75). As the texl affirms two directions of sense o;imultaneou:-.ly, II affirms the 
production of simulacra that muhiply heedless of the model Without the 
ability 10 recuperate identity, the text constitutes difference--lhe on ly unac-
countable entity in any system of totalization . Playing on the system that 
tries to envelop it, the Unnamable humorously covers overthc: lnIdition.clocb-
ing i, with its own "execration and disbelief' : 
There is no use denying, flO usc twping on the same old lIlina 
J !.;now so well. and so easy to say. and which simply amounts 
in the end 10 speaking yel .,ain in the way they inLCnd me 10 
speak.. that is say about them, even with execration and disbe. 
lief. Perhaps they exist in the way they have ~ will be 
mine , it 's possible. I don't know and I'm not interested. If 
they had taught me how 10 wish I'd wish they did. There', no 
getti ng rid of them without naming them and their coolrlp-
lions, that's the thing to keep in mind. (326) 
Grid-iocked-"'Ilhere's no gelling rid of them without naming them and 
their con traptions"--the text names (that is, pl ays in the existing language 
game). but does not promote clarification. identity o r verify the ontokltY of 
non-being, but divides "good" sense and produces a humorous readin, _ 
"speaking yet again in the way they intend me to speak." 
Lastly, the novel's concluding sentence might be Il parody ofme pmp 
of the brave Human ist's struggle to "go o n" no matter how pointless ",oioc 
o n" seems: " ... the words Utat remain, myoid story, which I've forgOtlcl ... 
where I am, l don't know, I' ll never know, in the silence you don't know.)'OI 
must go on , I can ', go on, I' ll go on" (4 13-14). The more traditional readi:a& 
interprets this passage in one of two ways: either in terms of the Sisyphus 
complex- goi ng on in life, persevering despite all odds: or in leOllS oftbe 
incessant "munnuring"- goi ng on in language, persevering in spilt oflbe 
"si lence." Usually these two readings are intertwined. Out of these readinp 
also arises the aesthetic of failure that gloomily holds onto its reductiveCU" 
ner of critical exegesis-never "failing" to render Beckett 's texts in terms" 
impotence and negativity. Yet, as we have come to understand. tbescre» 
ings. limited by their epistemological and interpretative biases, rarely MM 
the text. Humor. o n the o ther ha nd, initiates a reading-this present readiJrc 
functions primarily as a departure point for future readings-lhat allows for 
multiplicity and liberates The Umramable from the crilicaJ appropriatioa II 




Sec Gilles Oc:leu1.t, DiJfl"ncr n rip/filum 29: "Panout c'esl Ie masque. c' est Ie '!lIVestl, 
e'esc Ie v~IU. II v~n't! du nu. C't'S1 II." muquc, Ie v~rillble sujel de III rijXllllOO C"csl 
pal« que II repelilK>n diftere en nature de I. rcprc!sentanoo. que Ie rfptct nc peul t! u~ 
n:prtscnlc!. RUlis dolll00joun; tlre signlfi!!. masqut par ce qUI Ie slgnlric:, I1\llSqUJI"I JUI-
mo!me cc qu'jI ~ilnific . " 
(,"E,et)'whcrc: Inc m:lst. the disguise. the cmenng is the truth of the uncO\'ered [nakedl. 
I! IS the OInk which is the true subject of fepclilion II 15 bec.usc repetillon dllrcrs In kmd 
lin nalUre[ from repetition. thaI what IS repelled ("II01lU1 Ix rcpresc.'nled. but II muslal -
.... ·.)'5 be signified. masked by what signifies 11. llse]f maskm, what il sigmfies" My 
Lnnslallon.j 
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